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     A b s t r a c t  
This paper investigates how innovations in income taxes and government purchases 
originating in the U.S. affect the U.S. economy, and how these effects are transmitted 
to the Canadian economy. Using a semi-structural VAR model and data for both 
countries for the 1961:1-2004:3 period, we find that fiscal policy innovations 
originating in the U.S. are transmitted to the Canadian economy by international trade 
and capital flows through interest rate and exchange rate channels.  Unanticipated 
shocks to U.S. government purchases have beggar thy neighbor effects on Canada.  
U.S. output increases and Canadian output decreases in response to a positive shock to 
U.S. government purchases.  In response to an unanticipated increase in U.S. income 
taxes, U.S. output declines while U.S. and Canadian real interest rates rise.  The 
response of Canadian output, however, is not significantly different from zero. 
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As economies become more open to, and integrated with, the rest of the world 
by means of international trade and capital movements, shocks originating in one 
country are transmitted to other countries through various channels.  
Literature on the international transmission of fiscal disturbances dates back to 
the Mundell-Fleming model and the modified versions of the Mundell-Fleming model 
developed by Mussa (1979), Branson and Rotemberg (1980), and Corden and 
Turnovsky (1983), among others. These models are basically static and have a 
Keynesian flavor.  The more recent literature studies the international transmission of 
fiscal disturbances within the context of dynamic general equilibrium models based on 
micro foundations. Frenkel and Razin (1987), Buiter (1987), Razin (1990), Frenkel, 
Razin, and Sadka (1991), Turnovsky and Bianconi (1992), Baxter (1995), Roche 
(1996), Bianconi and Turnovsky (1997), and Mendoza and Tesar (1998) examine the 
international transmission of tax policies or government spending shocks using a two-
country intertemporal general equilibrium framework.   
  Vector Auto Regressive (VAR) models have been used extensively to analyze 
the effects of monetary policy innovations and, more recently, the effects of fiscal 
policy innovations.  Ramey and Shapiro (1998), Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher 
(1999), Yuan and Li (2000), Fatas and Mihov (2001), and Gali, Lopez-Salido, and 
Valles (2004) examine the dynamic response of the economy to government spending 
shocks.  Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Perotti (2002), De Arcangelis and Lamartina 
(2003), and van Aarle, Garretsen, and Gobbin (2003) investigate the effects of shocks 
to taxes and government spending on the economy.  
The empirical studies mentioned above improve our understanding of how 
fiscal shocks affect the economy but do not investigate how these shocks are 
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fiscal policies adopted in the U.S. have far reaching consequences which extend out 
beyond the borders of the U.S.  The actions of the Federal Reserve are watched 
carefully by market participants and policymakers around the world, and the monetary 
policies adopted in the U.S. have short-term effects on the world economy.  Fiscal 
policy actions, such as changes in marginal income tax rates and government 
purchases, also have worldwide effects.   
Despite the presence of a significant number of theoretical studies analyzing the 
international transmission of fiscal disturbances and the presence of empirical studies 
analyzing the international transmission of U.S monetary shocks, there is a big gap in 
the empirical analysis of the transmission of fiscal shocks.  The purpose of this paper is 
to fill this gap by investigating empirically the dynamic response of the U.S. and 
Canadian economies to fiscal policy shocks originating in the U.S., and analyzing how 
these shocks are transmitted to the Canadian economy.  For this purpose we estimate a 
semi-structural two-country VAR model for the period 1961:1-2004:3. 
  We find that a positive innovation in U.S. government purchases initially 
increases U.S. output.  The U.S. government expenditure innovations are transmitted to 
the Canadian economy by international trade and capital movements through interest 
rate and exchange rate channels.  The Canadian real interest rate increases while the 
real exchange rate appreciates.  Consequently, the Canadian GDP decreases. What we 
observe is a beggar thy neighbor effect on Canada. A positive shock to government 
purchases improves the U.S. GDP, but worsens the Canadian GDP.  A positive 
innovation in U.S. income taxes raises the U.S. real interest rate and leads to a 
reduction in the U.S. GDP.  The U.S. income tax innovations are transmitted to the 
Canadian economy, similarly by international trade and capital movements through 
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real exchange rate depreciates.  Due to offsetting effects of investment and the trade 
balance on the Canadian GDP, U.S. income tax innovations do not have a statistically 
significant effect on the Canadian GDP.     
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 lays out some of 
the theoretical arguments surrounding the international transmission of fiscal policies.  
Section 3 explains the data and methodology used in this paper.  Section 4 presents the 
empirical results.  Section 5 introduces some checks for robustness, and Section 6 
provides concluding remarks.   
2. Theoretical  Background 
In Keynesian models the exchange rate plays a key role in the transmission of 
fiscal disturbances.  For example, in a two-country model of the world economy a 
fiscal expansion at home leads to an appreciation of the exchange rate, which improves 
the current account of the foreign country and deteriorates that of the home country.  
Due to partial crowding-out at home, however, output increases both at home and 
abroad. 
  The international transmission of fiscal policies in general equilibrium models 
based on micro foundations is more complex.  Assumptions related to whether the 
fiscal shock is permanent or temporary, whether international asset markets are 
complete or not, whether labor supply is fixed or variable, and assumptions on how 
government purchases are financed affect the outcomes of such models.   
Baxter (1995), under the assumption that individuals can engage in 
consumption-smoothing, but not risk pooling (i.e., incomplete asset markets), and that 
prices are flexible, finds that a permanent increase in government purchases in the 
home country generates a negative wealth effect by reducing permanent income and 
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decrease in consumption and leisure and an increase in labor input.  The increase in the 
real interest rate generates an intertemporal substitution effect and leads to a secondary 
rise in labor input.  When the rise in the real interest rate is transmitted to the foreign 
country, foreign labor input increases as well.  The increase in labor input increases the 
marginal product of capital, which in turn leads to an increase in investment through 
the accelerator.  With an increase in labor and capital stock, output permanently 
increases at home.  In the foreign country output initially increases due to an increase in 
labor input, but investment falls.  Since the foreign country finances the current account 
deficit of the home country, labor input is relatively lower and consumption is higher in 
the foreign country in this new steady state.   When the economy is faced with a 
permanent, unanticipated decline in the tax rate, the results are a positive wealth effect, 
an increase in the real interest rate, and an increase in the marginal product of labor.  
The positive wealth effect has a negative effect on labor input.  The rise in the real 
interest rate and the increase in the marginal product of labor increases the labor input.  
The two substitution effects outweigh the wealth effect and, therefore, the labor input 
increases. This leads to an increase in output and investment.  Labor input increases in 
the foreign country when the real interest rate rises.  Foreign output initially increases, 
but then falls over time.   Investment falls in the foreign country, as capital moves to 
the home country.  
Bianconi and Turnovsky (1997) find that the effects of government expenditure 
shocks differ based on the form of financing.  An increase in government purchases 
financed by a lump-sum tax has a positive effect on employment and production at 
home, but a negative effect abroad.  When government expenditures are financed by a 
tax on capital, just the opposite happens.  An increase in government expenditures 
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expenditures, financed by lump-sum taxes, decreases wealth, which leads to an increase 
in labor supply and a decrease in consumption.  A higher labor supply increases the 
productivity of capital and increases capital stock at home, while decreasing it abroad, 
in the short-run.  In the long–run, capital stock increases in both countries, but it 
remains below its initial equilibrium point in the foreign country.  Therefore, 
government spending financed by lump-sum taxes is expansionary at home and 
contractionary abroad.  
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) construct a model, which bridges the gap between 
the flexible-price dynamic general equilibrium models and the traditional sticky-price 
Keynesian models.  Their model is based on dynamic optimization, nominal price 
rigidities, and microfoundations of aggregate supply.   In response to a permanent 
increase in Home-government spending, short-run Home-income rises by more than 
long-run Home-income.  Therefore, current consumption falls more than the increase in 
government spending.  This leads to a fall in the short-run real interest rate.  Home 
consumption falls relative to foreign consumption since domestic residents are paying 
for the government spending.  This change in relative consumption levels lowers the 
demand for Home money, and leads to a depreciation of the Home currency.  When 
current consumption falls more then the increase in output, the current account 
improves.     
3.  Data and Methodology 
3.1.   Data 
The data used to estimate the model consist of quarterly observations for the 
U.S. and Canada for the period 1961:1-2004:3.  The U.S. data employed in this paper 
are obtained from the DRI database and the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank’s Fred II 
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defense expenditures and nominal income tax revenue series are from the DRI 
database.  The 3-month Treasury bill rate, and the CPI series are from the Fred II 
database.  The Canadian data are obtained from the CANSIM database and the DRI 
database.  Real GDP, consumption expenditures, investment expenditures, exports, and 
imports are from the CANSIM database.  The 3-month Treasury bill rate, CPI, and the 
nominal exchange rate series are from the DRI database. National defense expenditures 
and income tax revenues series are deflated by the GDP deflator.  The inflation rate is 
calculated as the percentage change in the CPI.  Exact definitions of the variables used 
are presented in Table 1. 
3.2.   Methodology 
To investigate the dynamic response of the U.S. and Canadian economies to 
fiscal policy shocks originating in the U.S., and to analyze how these shocks are 
transmitted to the Canadian economy, VARs are employed. The benchmark model 
comprises of the following eight variables: U.S. price level (P, GDP deflator), U.S. 
income taxes (T, total personal tax revenues in current dollars deflated by the GDP 
deflator), U.S. government purchases (G, real government purchases), the U.S real 
interest rate (r, measured as the difference between the 3-month U.S. Treasury bill rate 
and the U.S. inflation rate), U.S. output (Y, measured by the U.S. real GDP), the 
Canadian real interest rate (r*, measured as the difference between the 3-month 
Canadian Treasury bill rate and the Canadian inflation rate), the real exchange rate (RE, 
calculated as the nominal exchange rate, i.e. the Canadian dollar per the U.S. dollar, 
multiplied by the U.S. CPI and divided by the Canadian CPI), and Canadian output (Y*, 
measured by the Canadian real GDP). 
  6  All the variables in our benchmark model are estimated in natural logarithms 
except the real interest rate.  The Likelihood Ratio (LR) test is used to choose the 
appropriate lag-length, which was found to be four.  
  The benchmark VAR model is derived from the following structural model: 
01 1 tt t q t q XA XA X A X t ε −− =+ + + + "        ( 1 )  
where
** ,, , , ,,, t t tt tttt t X PGYrTY r R E ′ ⎡ = ⎣⎤ ⎦
q
= vector of endogenous variables,  = 
coefficient matrix specifying the contemporaneous relations among the variables in the 
model,  ,  are coefficient matrices on q lagged values of X, and 
0 A
i A 1, , i = " t ε = vector 
of structural shocks which are assumed to be uncorrelated.  The VAR model is the 
reduced form of this structural model and can be written as: 
11 tt q t q t X BX BX U −− =+ + + "          ( 2 )  
where  i B ,  , =  1, , iq = "
1
0 () i I AA
− −  and 
1
0 () tt UI A ε
− =− .  




tt t t t t t t t Uu u u u u u u u ′ ⎡ ⎤ = ⎣ ⎦ .  
As can be seen from the definition of  , the elements of  will, in general, be 
correlated.  Once the VAR model is estimated, the structural shocks can be recovered 
from the reduced form residuals by imposing restrictions on the contemporaneous 
relations among the model variables, i.e. by specifying the non-zero elements of  .  
t U t U
0 A
  Structural shocks to fiscal policy are identified from a Choleski decomposition 
of the variance-covariance matrix.  The Choleski decomposition imposes a recursive 
contemporaneous causal structure on the model, i.e.   is a lower-diagonal matrix with 
one’s on the diagonal.  The model variables are ordered in a particular sequence, and 
variables higher in the ordering are assumed to cause contemporaneous changes in 
0 A
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variables higher in the ordering only with a lag.      
The ordering used is: P, G, Y, r, T,Y*, r*, RE.  Because spending appropriation 
bills in the U.S. typically specify government purchases in current dollar terms, the 
price level is ordered before real government purchases.  With spending levels 
specified in nominal terms, variations in the current price level affect the real value of 
government spending in the current period.  Previous studies that ignore this type of 
contemporaneous feedback may well misestimate structural shocks to government 
purchases.  With G ordered after P, structural shocks to G are assumed to affect P only 
with a lag.  Given the common presumption of short-run rigidities in prices, this seems 
to be a reasonable assumption.  G is, however, ordered before Y which allows changes 
in G to have contemporaneous effects on output, but allows only a lagged discretionary 
response of G to movements in Y.  Allowing a contemporaneous effect of G on Y is 
appropriate since government purchases are a component of Y  and can also affect 
inventories in the current period.  Given the nature of decision and implementation lags 
in fiscal policymaking, specifying a discretionary response of government purchases 
only to lagged output is a plausible assumption.   
With regard to income tax revenues (T), P, G, Y, and r are ordered before T.  
Automatic stabilizers imply a contemporaneous response of taxes and transfer 
payments to changes in macro variables like P and Y.  Therefore, placing T after these 
variables allows for automatic stabilizing effects, but constrains changes in income 
taxes to affect the macroeconomy only with a lag.  Since the U.S. tax code and transfer 
payments are not perfectly indexed to the price level, variations in current prices can 
affect real income tax revenues, and previous studies that omit prices from the model 
thus ignore a source of feedback from the current state of the economy to income taxes 
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interest payments on short-term debt that is rolled over, and since the measure of 
transfers used here includes interest payments on government debt, placing T after r 
allows changes in r to affect current net taxes.  Changes in income taxes affect 
aggregate spending primarily by altering disposable income and hence consumption; 
and placing T after the macro variables implies a lag between a change in disposable 
income and the implementation of any resulting change in spending plans.    Placing G 
before T implies that decisions about government purchases are made prior to decisions 
about taxes and decisions about taxes and transfers affect government purchases only 
with a lag.  This assumption is more controversial than ordering T after P, Y, and r 
since it is not uncommon for fiscal policymakers to discuss plans for purchases after 
having an idea about expected tax revenues.     
The last three variables in the ordering are the Canadian GDP Y*, real interest 
rate r*, and the real exchange rate ER.  This ordering allows contemporaneous effects 
of the U.S. variables on the Canadian variables and the real exchange rate as well as 
contemporaneous effects of the Canadian GDP and the real interest rate on the real 
exchange rate.  The Canadian variables are ordered after the U.S. variables because 
Canada is a small open economy and, therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the U.S. 
variables have a contemporaneous effect on the Canadian variables, while the Canadian 
variables affect the U.S. variables with a lag.   
  The above ordering also reflects the channels of transmission of fiscal policy. A 
shock to U.S. government purchases G has a contemporaneous effect on Y, r, Y*, and 
r*.  Y is affected both directly by changes in G and indirectly by changes in r.  Changes 
in r have a contemporaneous effect on r* and RE.  A shock to U.S. fiscal policy affects 
Y* through different channels.  First, it alters the inter-temporal decisions of U.S. 
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exports and, hence, Canadian net exports.  Second, by changing r* and RE it has an 
effect on Canadian investment expenditures and net exports and, therefore, on Y*.    
4. Empirical  Results 
4.1.  The International Transmission of U.S.  Government Purchases 
Innovations 
  The IRFs of the model variables to a positive innovation in U.S. government 
purchases are presented in Figure 1.  U.S. output immediately rises in response to a 
positive innovation in government purchases, and the positive response of output is 
significantly different from zero during the first two quarters.  The response of output 
quickly becomes negative after the third quarter, but this response is not significantly 
different from zero.  The real interest rate first falls, and then rises, but the response of 
the real interest rate is not significantly different from zero, except for the 6
th and 9
th 
quarters.  The decrease in Canadian output in response to a positive innovation in U.S. 
government purchases is significantly different from zero after the 4
th quarter.  The 
Canadian real interest rate rises immediately, and its response is significantly different 
from zero during the first and in between the 2
nd and 15
th quarters.  The real exchange 
rate falls in response to a positive innovation in U.S. government purchases, and its 
response is significantly different from zero after the 8
th quarter. 
  U.S. and Canadian GDPs react differently to a positive innovation in U.S. 
government purchases.  When we compare the statistically significant portion of the 
IRFs, we find that while U.S. output increases, Canadian output decreases.  This 
implies that unanticipated shocks to U.S. government purchases have beggar thy 
neighbor effects on Canada.    
  10  When we calculate the government purchases multipliers in our benchmark 
model from the IRFs, we find that a 1% increase in government purchases increases 
U.S. output by 0.13%, but decreases Canadian output by 0.32%.  This result is quite 
striking because it indicates that the U.S. government purchases multiplier has a greater 
impact on the Canadian economy than the U.S. economy.      
4.2.   The International Transmission of U.S. Income Tax Innovations 
  The IRFs of the model variables to a positive innovation in income taxes are 
presented in Figure 2.  The response of U.S. output is negative and significantly 
different from zero after the second quarter.  The U.S. real interest rate rises in response 
to a positive innovation in income taxes.  The positive response of the real interest rate 
is significantly different from zero in between the first and third quarters and after the 
fourth quarter.  As expected, the rise in the real interest rate is correlated with the 
decline in output.  What seems surprising, however, is the way the real interest rate 
responds to the tax innovation.  Neither the Keynesian, nor the general equilibrium 
models predict a rise in the real interest rate in response to an increase in taxes.  The 
rise in the real interest rate, however, can be explained by modifying the sticky-price 
intertemporal model of Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996).  With an increase in taxes, short-
run Home income falls by a greater amount than does long-run Home income.  Home 
residents adjust their current consumption upwards to smooth consumption.  This 
results in a decrease in current savings and, hence, the real interest rate increases.    
  The response of the Canadian output is not significantly different from zero at 
all horizons.  The Canadian real interest rate rises in response to a positive innovation 
in U.S. income taxes, and it is significantly different from zero during the second, 
fourth, and in between the seventh and thirteenth quarters. The real exchange rate rises, 
but its response is not significantly different from zero. 
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  When we calculate the tax multipliers from the IRFs, we find that a 1% increase 
in income taxes decreases U.S. output by 0.13%, which is similar to the number we had 
for government purchases multiplier.  
Extensions and Checks for Robustness 
Why does the Canadian output decline in response to an innovation to U.S. 
government purchases?  The IRFs indicate that the U.S. and Canadian real interest rates 
both rise in response to an unanticipated increase in U.S. government purchases and the 
real exchange rate (the value of the U.S. basket in terms of the value of the Canadian 
basket) depreciates.  The depreciation of the real exchange rate is consistent with the 
real interest rate parity relationship.  The response of the U.S. and Canadian real 
interest rates and the real exchange rate highlight the real interest rate and the real 
exchange rate as the two channels of transmission.  A plausible explanation is that 
when the U.S. real interest rate rises, capital flows from Canada to the U.S. lead to a 
rise in the real interest rate in Canada.  An increase in the Canadian real interest rate is 
expected to reduce consumption and investment expenditures.  These changes would 
explain the decline in Canadian output.   
To investigate the response of Canadian consumption C* and investment I* 
expenditures, we estimated two different VAR models where 
** * ,, , , ,,,, t t tt ttt tt t X PGYrTY C r R E ′ ⎡⎤ = ⎣⎦  and 
*** ,, , , ,,,, t t tt ttt tt t X PGYrTY I r R E ′ ⎡ ⎤ = ⎣ ⎦ . The IRFs 
of these two models reveal that while the response of consumption expenditures is not 
significant, the negative response of investment expenditures is significantly different 
from zero, indicating that the decline in investment expenditures is the reason for the 
decrease in Canadian output (see Figures A.1.1 and A.1.2). 
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innovations in government purchases and income taxes.  For example, while an 
unanticipated increase in U.S. government purchases leads to a decrease in Canadian 
output and this response is significantly different from zero, the response of Canadian 
output to unanticipated increases in income taxes is not significantly different from 
zero.  A plausible explanation is that a positive innovation to U.S. income taxes affects 
the components of Canadian output in opposite directions.  
  To investigate the response of Canadian consumption expenditures C*, 
investment expenditures I*, and the trade balance TB*, we estimated three different 
VAR models where 
** * ,, , , ,,,, tt t t t t t t tt X PGYrTY C r R E ′ ⎡ ⎤ = ⎣ ⎦ , 
*** ,, , , ,,,, t t tt ttt tt t X PGYrTY I r R E ′ ⎡⎤ = ⎣⎦ , and   
** * ,, , , ,, ,, tt t t t t t t tt X PGYrTY T B r R E ′ ⎡ ⎤ = ⎣ ⎦ .   The 
IRFs of these models indicate that in response to an unanticipated increase in taxes, 
consumption decreases, but its response is not significantly different from zero.   
Investment decreases, and its response is significantly different from zero.  The trade 
balance, however, responds positively, and its response is significantly different from 
zero.  The decrease in the Canadian investment expenditures is in line with the increase 
in the Canadian real interest rate, and the improvement of the Canadian trade balance is 
consistent with depreciation of the Canadian real exchange rate (see Figures A.2.1, 
A.2.2, and A.2.3).    
  In our identification scheme we make the assumption that decisions regarding 
government purchases have a contemporaneous effect on income taxes, but that income 
taxes affect government purchases with a lag.  This assumes that decisions involving 
government purchases are prior to those of income taxes.  In reality it is quite possible 
that decisions related to income taxes are prior to those regarding government 
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assumption that income taxes have a contemporaneous effect on government purchases.  
To check the robustness of our results, we reversed the Choleski ordering of the two 
variables, and estimated the VAR model where
** ,, ,,, ,, tt t t t t t tt X PTGYrY r R E ′ ⎡ ⎤ = ⎣ ⎦ .  
Changing the ordering did not change any of the results (see Figures A.3.1 and A.3.2).  
  In our analysis we used government purchases as a measure of government 
spending since this was the most comprehensive measure.  Are the results sensitive to 
using other measures of government spending?  To check the robustness of our results, 
we estimated our benchmark model by replacing real government purchases with 
national defense expenditures.  The results are quite robust.  The only exception is the 
IRF of U.S. output in response to an innovation to national defense expenditures.  We 
find that U.S. output increases during the first two quarters, and then decreases after the 
fourth quarter, and these responses are significantly different from zero.  This result is 
interesting by itself because it indicates that although national defense expenditures 
have a stimulating effect on output initially, the rise in output is followed by a 
persistent decline in output later on (see Figures A.4.1 and A.4.2). 
6.   Concluding Remarks 
In this paper we investigate the dynamic response of the U.S. and Canadian 
economies to fiscal policy shocks originating in the U.S.   We find that a positive 
innovation in U.S. government purchases has a short-run stimulating effect on U.S. 
output and it also leads to an increase in the U.S. real interest rate.  The increase in the 
U.S. real interest rate is transmitted to the Canadian economy as capital flows in from 
Canada to the U.S.  Capital outflows from Canada increases the Canadian real interest 
rate.  The increase in the Canadian real interest rate reduces Canadian investment 
expenditures and Canadian output. Thus, unanticipated increases in U.S. government 
  14purchases have a beggar thy neighbor effect on Canada. A positive shock to 
government purchases improves U.S. GDP but worsens Canadian GDP.  While a 1% 
increase in U.S. government purchases increases U.S. output by .13%, it decreases 
Canadian output by .32%.  In response to an unanticipated increase in U.S. income 
taxes, U.S. output declines.  A positive innovation in U.S. income taxes also raises the 
U.S. real interest rate.  U.S. income tax innovations are transmitted to the Canadian 
economy via interest rate and exchange rate channels. The Canadian real interest rate 
rises and the real exchange rate depreciates, although the response of the Canadian real 
exchange rate is not significantly different from zero.  The response of Canadian output 
is negative for the most part, but this is not significantly different from zero.    Thus, 
unlike shocks to U.S. government purchases, U.S. income tax shocks do not have 
beggar thy neighbor effects on Canada.   
These findings have important policy implications when considered within the 
context of President Bush’s tax cuts over the next ten years and a significant rise in 
government spending.  Our findings about the effects of tax cuts are in contrast to 
Mendoza (2001) who, using a calibrated two-country general equilibrium model, shows 
that while a 5% cut in capital income tax in the United Kingdom increases the trend 
level of consumption per capita by 1.1% in the United Kingdom, the same tax cut 
decreases the trend level of consumption per capita by 3.7% in Continental Europe.  
Our income tax multipliers are smaller than those suggested by Mendoza (2001), and 
have the opposite sign.  Perotti (2002) also indicates that the estimated tax multipliers 
are smaller when compared to the ones suggested by the theoretical literature.   
Future econometric work analyzing the transmission of U.S. fiscal policies to 
other countries would indicate whether the results reached in this study could be 
generalized or not.  
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  17TABLE 1 
Definition and Data Sources for the Variables Used 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Variable   Definition     Data  Source  and  Code 
 
GDP (U.S.)    chained 2000 dollars, SAAR    DRI, GDPR  
 
GDP (U.S.)    current dollars, SAAR      DRI, GDP 
 
Government    Government Consumption and  DRI, GR 
Purchases (U.S.)  Gross Investment, chained 2000 
   d o l l a r s  
 
National   National  defense, Government  DRI, GFML 
Defense    consumption expenditures and 
Expenditures (U.S.)  gross investment, current dollars 
 
Income Taxes   Personal Current Taxes (Federal,  DRI, TXP 
(U.S.)    state,  local)  current  dollars 
 
Treasury-bill rate  3-month Treasury bill, secondary  FRED II, TB3MS 
(U.S.)    market  rate 
 
CPI (U.S.)     Consumer price index for all urban  FRED II, CPIAUSL 
   consumers,  all  items,  SA 
 
GDP (CAN)    chained 1997 dollars, SAAR    CANSIM, v1992067 
 
Consumption    Personal expenditures on    CANSIM, v1992044 
Expenditures (CAN)   consumption goods and services,  
chained 1997 dollars, SAAR 
 
Investment    Business gross fixed capital     CANSIM, v1992052 
Expenditures (CAN)  formation, chained 1997 dollars,  
   S A A R  
 
Exports (CAN)  Exports of goods and services,  CANSIM, v1992060 
   chained  1997  dollars,  SAAR 
 
Imports (CAN)  Imports of goods and services,  CANSIM, v1992063 
   chained  1997  dollars,  SAAR 
 
CPI (CAN)     Consumer price index for all urban  DRI, L64@C156 
   consumers,  all  items,  SA 
 
Treasury-bill rate  3-month Treasury bill, secondary  DRI, L60@C156 
(CAN)    market  rate 
 
Exchange Rate  Canadian dollar per U.S. dollar  RX@CN 
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Figure 1   Shock to U.S. Government Purchases 
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Figure 2   Shock to U.S. Income Taxes 
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Figure A.1.1   Shock to U.S. Government Purchases
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Figure A.1.2    Shock to U.S. Government Purchases 
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Figure A.2.1   Shock to U.S. Income Taxes 
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Figure A.2.2   Shock to U.S. Income Taxes 
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Figure A.2.3   Shock to U.S. Income Taxes 
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Figure A.3.1   Shock to U.S. Government Purchases 
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Figure A.3.2   Shock to U.S. Income Taxes 
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Figure A.4.1   Shock to U.S. Defense Expenditures 
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Figure A.4.2   Shock to U.S. Income Taxes 
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